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GET YOUR FACTAS STRAIGHT: THE
APPLICATION OF FACTA'S TRUNCATION
PROVISION TO ONLINE TRANSACTIONS
REBECCA J. SAYLESt
INTRODUCTION
"But he that filches from me my good name/Robs me of that
which not enriches him/And makes me poor indeed." - William
Shakespeare'
Unfortunately, an alarmingly high number of people in the
United States are intimately familiar with the message artfully
hidden within Shakespeare's words; identity theft is an
extremely destructive crime. Defined by the United States
Department of Justice as a crime "in which someone wrongfully
obtains and uses another person's personal data in some way
that involves fraud or deception, typically for economic gain,"2
identity theft left over eleven million people victimized in 2009
alone.' Moreover, identity theft is on the rise, as the number of
victims in 2009 represented an increase of over one million
victims as compared to 2008.4
Identity theft has not left its victims or the economy
unscathed. Individual victims of identity theft spend an average
of twenty-one working hours' and an aggregated total of $5
billion in out-of-pocket expenses in order to repair the damage
t Associate Managing Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John's
University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Stony Brook University. I would like to thank
Professor Jeremy Weintraub for his invaluable guidance and support.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3.
2 Identity Theft and Identity Fraud, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
httpf//www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/websites/idtheft.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2013).
3 JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, 2010 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY REPORT:
CONSUMER VERSION 5 (2010), available at https://wwwjavelinstrategy.com/uploads/
files/1004.R_2010IdentityFraudSurveyConsumer.pdf
4 Id.
5 Id.
1011
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
caused by identity theft.6  Moreover, other intangible costs are
associated with identity theft for victims, such as the mental
anguish endured while repairing their financial reputation.' In
addition, United States businesses lose an estimated $48 billion
annually as a result of identity theft." Quite notably, it is
estimated that in 2006 alone, online merchants lost $3 billion in
revenue as a result of transactions involving the fraudulent use
of credit or debt card account numbers.9
As evidenced by the alarming cost of identity theft to online
merchants, the crime has adapted itself to the evolving habits of
consumers. Electronic commerce has consistently increased in
recent years, with online retail sales continuing to increase their
proportion of the overall retail market.'o Despite the sluggish
economy, online retail is "red-hot by comparison," yielding a
double-digit growth trajectory." A new generation of buyers now
purchases everything from clothing1 2  and groceries' 3  to
electronics14 and cars" online. Many online merchants now
provide e-mail receipts or purchase confirmations to their
customers as a replacement for the paper receipt the customer
would have obtained in a face-to-face transaction.'6  In turn,
consumers hold on to these so-called "e-receipts," just as they
would for paper receipts, in case the product purchased turns out
6 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Releases Survey of Identity Theft in
U.S. 27.3 Million Victims in Past 5 Years, Billions in Losses for Buss. & Consumers
(Sept. 3, 2003), available at www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/09/idtheft.htm.
7 See Identity Theft and Identity Fraud, supra note 2.
8 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 6.
9 CYBERSOURCE, 8TH ANNuAL ONLINE FRAUD REPORT: ONLINE PAYMENT
FRAUD TRENDS, MERCHANT PRACTICES & BENCHMARKS 3 (2007), available at
http://www.lazworld.com/whitepapers/CYBS 2007_FraudReport.pdf.
10 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2009 E-STATS 3 (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2009/2009reportfinal.pdf [hereinafter "2009 E-
STATS"; see Paul Schottmiller et al., Want Growth? Build Online Stores, Cisco
INTERNET BUS. SOLUTIONS GRP. 1 (May 2011), available at http://www.cisco.com/
web/about/ac79/docs/retail/E-Commerce-GrowthIBSG_052OFINAL.pdf.
" Schottmiller et al., supra note 10, at 1.
12 See, e.g., MACY'S, http://www.macys.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
13 See, e.g., PEAPOD.COM, http://www.peapod.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
14 See, e.g., APPLE STORE, http://store.apple.com/us (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
15 See, e.g., Cars & Trucks, EBAY, http://motors.shop.ebay.com/6001/i.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2013).
16 Jason Fitterer, Comment, Putting a Lid on Online Dumpster-Diving: Why the
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act Should Be Amended To Include E-Mail
Receipts, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 591, 597 (2011).
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to be unsatisfactory or defective." "Archive" and "search"
functions offered by many e-mail providers allow users to store
these e-receipts for years while enabling quick retrieval of a
particular e-receipt at a later date. 8
Identity thieves, because of this change in consumer
behavior, have adapted their modus operandi to capitalize on the
new technologies available to consumers. "Old fashioned" credit
card fraud was often perpetrated through "dumpster diving," in
which perpetrators actually rummaged through dumpsters and
trash bins outside of businesses and personal residences in
search of bills, receipts, or other documents that contained
valuable personal information such as Social Security numbers,
phone numbers, and credit card or other financial account
information." However, as a result of the changes in consumer
habits outlined above, the Internet has become the modern-day
dumpster.2 0 Modern-day identity thieves are now turning to the
Internet to find their next victim.2 ' As consumers make more
purchases online and subsequently store their electronic receipts
and purchase confirmations in e-mail archives, potential
fraudsters are accessing this information by hacking into the
victim's account and taking advantage of the archive and search
features to quickly and easily find these e-receipts that often
contain sensitive information.22
So, what happens when an online retailer sends its
customers e-mail receipts or purchase confirmations containing
potentially compromising information, such as a person's credit
card account number? In a recent example of exactly this
situation, a customer noticed his full credit card number and
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 About Identity Theft, FED. TRADE COMWN, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/
microsites/idtheft/consumers/about-identity-theft.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2013);
The Fair Credit Reporting Act and Issues Presented by Reauthorization of the
Expiring Preemption Provisions: Hearing on The Growing Problem of Identity Theft
and Its Relationship to the Fair Credit Reporting Act Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 83-84 (2003) (statement of
Timothy Caddigan, Special Agent In Charge, Criminal Investigative Div., U.S.
Secret Serv.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg95254/pdfl
CHRG-108shrg95254.pdf.
20 Drew Voros, Your Online Privacy Slips Through Web's Cracks, CONTRA
COSTA TIMES, October 19, 2010, available at http://www.insidebayarea.com/
breaking-news/ci_16378229.
21 Fitterer, supra note 16, at 597.
22 Id.
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security code on an order confirmation e-mail sent from the
catalogue company Argos." If any of Argos' customers who
received such an email had their e-mail account compromised,
the hacker would need only do a quick search of the e-mail's
archive to find the customer's credit card information before he or
she could begin making fraudulent purchases online.24 The
question then becomes: Do Argos's customers have any recourse
against the company for subjecting them to an increased risk of
identity theft?
Many people in such a position have turned to the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act ("FACTA") for help. Passed in
2003, FACTA contains a provision mandating that no merchant
who accepts credit or debit cards shall "print" more than the last
five digits of the credit or debit card number, or the card's
expiration date on any receipt that is "electronically printed" and
provided at "the point of sale."" This "truncation" provision was
aimed at furthering FACTA's overall purpose of preventing
identity theft.26 As many in the industry have noted, "receipts
that include full account numbers and expiration dates are a gold
mine for identity thieves,"2 and the dangers of identity theft
occurring as a result of a non-truncated credit card receipt are
widely known.28 FACTA's truncation provision was aimed at
eliminating this risk for consumers.2 9 Moreover, since identity
theft is a nationwide concern, Congress believed a uniform
national standard was the best way to help prevent it.3 0
Therefore, FACTA provided that the truncation provision
preempts state laws that attempted to regulate credit card
23 John Leyden, Argos Buries Unencrypted Credit Card Data in Email Receipts,
THE REGISTER (Mar. 5, 2010 11:49 GMT), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/03/05/
argosemail security-snafu.
24 Fitterer, supra note 16, at 598.
25 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
26 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117
Stat. 1952 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
27 PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, FACT SHEET 6A: FACTS ON FACTA, THE
FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT 13, available at
https://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6a-facta.htm (Jan. 2013).
28 Daniel R. LeCours, Note, Steering Clear of the "Road to Nowhere": Why the
BMW Guideposts Should Not Be Used To Review Statutory Penalty Awards, 63
RUTGERS L. REv. 327, 344-45 (2010).
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a.
30 See 149 CONG. REC. H12,215 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Michael Oxley), available at http//www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2003-11-21/pdf/
CREC-2003-11-21-ptl-PgH12198.pdf.
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receipt truncation."' In the event of a violation of the provision,
FACTA provides that a consumer can recover either actual
damageS32 or, if the consumer is able to prove the violation was
willful, statutory damages of $100 to $1,000 per violation."
Markedly, FACTA does not cap the amount of damages
recoverable in a class action brought under the Act,3 4 which has
resulted in a vast majority of the lawsuits brought under FACTA
being brought as class actions. 5
Nonetheless, the case for our Argos customer is not as black
and white as it may seem. While Argos did not truncate its
receipts in accordance with FACTA's truncation provision, courts
are split as to whether the provision is even applicable to online
transactions. The conflict stems from the lack of a statutory
definition for the term "print," the resulting divergent
interpretations of its meaning, and the impact of those divergent
interpretations upon FACTA's application to online transactions.
Some courts reason that the plain meaning of the term "print" is
clear-that the term ordinarily means recording information on
paper.37  Therefore these courts conclude that the term's plain
meaning limits the applicability of the truncation provision to
paper receipts printed by merchants in face-to-face
transactions.3 8 These courts bolster their reasoning by
highlighting the potentially debilitating effects businesses may
face as a result of a technical violation of the truncation
provision, given the unlimited aggregated damages available in
class actions brought under FACTA." In contrast, other courts
have held that based on the explicit congressional intent
31 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681t(b)(5)(A) (West 2011).
32 Id. § 1681o.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
34 LeCours, supra note 28, at 344.
3 Michael E. Chaplin, What's So Fair About the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 307, 411 (2008).
36 Compare Smith v. Under Armour, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1287 (S.D. Fla.
2008) and Narson v. Godaddy.com, Inc., No. CV-08-0177-PHX-SRB, 2008 WL
2790211, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2008) with Grabein v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., No.
07-22235-CIV, 2008 WL 343179, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2008) and Vasquez-Torres
v. Stubhub, Inc., No. CV 07-1328 PSG, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63719, at *9 (C.D. Cal.
July 2, 2007).
37 See, e.g., Shlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 794, 799 (7th Cir.
2010).
3 Id.
9 See, e.g., Lopez v. KB Toys Retail, Inc., No. CV 07-144-JFW, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82025, at *14 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2007).
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underlying FACTA, namely to prevent identity theft and to
create a uniform national standard to further that end, the term
"print" should be broadly interpreted so as to include electronic
receipts.4 0 Therefore, these courts conclude that the truncation
provision should be applicable to e-mail receipts generated in
online transactions.4
This Note argues that FACTA's truncation provision should
apply to online transactions and e-mail receipts as currently
written, but recognizes the necessity of limiting the potentially
devastating liability that online merchants would face for a
technical violation of the provision in a class action lawsuit. Part
I of this Note explores FACTA's statutory landscape, paying
particular attention to the truncation and statutory damages
provisions. Part II analyzes the conflicting viewpoints that have
arisen through attempts to apply FACTA's truncation provision
to online transactions. Finally, Part III argues that an
interpretation of the truncation provision that does not make it
applicable to online transaction is an improper interpretation of
the provision given FACTA's legislative purpose, its statutory
language, and overall public policy concerns. However, in light of
the probability that online merchants would be subject to
debilitating liability for technical violations of the provision in a
class action situation, this Part also proposes that Congress
amend the statutory relief provision so as to limit potential class
action liability.
I. FACTA's STATUTORY LANDSCAPE
"Get your facts first, and then you can distort them as much as
you please." - Mark Twain4 2
The FACTA was passed in 2003 in response to growing
concerns of identity theft. Enacted as an amendment to the Fair
Credit Reporting Act of 1970 ("FCRA"), FACTA was explicitly
intended to prevent identity theft through the implementation of
various provisions specifically designed to protect consumers,4 3
including a requirement that merchants truncate the credit card
44information contained on receipts provided to their customers.
40 See, e.g., Vasquez-Torres, 2007 US Dist. LEXIS 63719, at *8-9.
41 Id. at *9.
42 ROBERT ANDREWS, THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 741 (1993).
1 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
4 Id. § 1681c(g) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
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This Part describes FACTA's statutory landscape in detail, first
explaining the limitation of FCRA that brought about FACTA's
enactment, then exploring the Act itself, paying particular
attention to the truncation and relief provisions.
FCRA was passed in 1970 in response to the growth of the
consumer credit reporting industry.4 5 As a consumer protection
statute, FCRA was designed to address concerns over the
accuracy of consumer credit reports and the transparency of
consumer reporting agencies.46 More specifically, a key purpose
of FCRA was to prevent these agencies from maintaining secret
consumer files that could potentially contain inaccurate
information.4 7 The concern was that these inaccuracies could
negatively affect a consumer's ability to obtain credit. Under
FCRA, these agencies are required to "maintain reasonable
procedures" designed to prevent inaccuracies in consumer credit
reports49 and to notify consumers whenever an investigative
consumer report is being prepared on their behalf.5 0 In 1996, in
response to assertions from consumer credit agencies that
accuracy and completeness of consumer reports would be further
enhanced by a national standard,"' Congress amended FCRA to
"create a uniform national standard for consumer protections
governing credit transactions."52 Congress achieved this by
providing for federal preemption of state laws, but the
preemption was subject to a sunset provision that went into
effect on January 1, 2004.11
As FCRA was designed primarily to ensure the accuracy of
credit reports by regulating the procedures of credit reporting
agencies,54 it was not adept at handling the new breed of errors
contained in consumer credit reports as a result of the emerging
4 Gail Hillebrand, After the FACTA: State Power To Prevent Identity Theft, 17
Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 53, 54 (2004).
4 15 U.S.C § 1681 (2006) (stating that the FCRA was designed "to insure that
consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness,
impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's right to privacy").
47 Hillebrand, supra note 45, at 54.
4 Id.
4 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681e (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
50 15 U.S.C. § 1681d (2006).
6" Hillebrand, supra note 45, at 55.
52 H.R. REP. NO. 108-263, at 24 (2003).
53 Id.
I See 15 U.S.C § 1681 (2006).
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problem of identity theft."5  In response to these concerns,
Congress further amended FCRA in 2003 by passing FACTA.5 6
As a "comprehensive consumer protection billl],"6 FACTA
amended FCRA with the explicit purpose of preventing identity
theft." To achieve that end, FACTA contained several provisions
specifically intended to help consumers combat identity theft.'9
Most importantly for this Note, one of these new protections was
a credit card number truncation requirement for receipts,60 which
was specifically aimed at "prevent[ing] criminals from obtaining
easy access to such key information."6 ' According to this
"truncation provision," "no person that accepts credit cards or
debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than
the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon
any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of sale or
transaction."6 2 The provision limits its applicability to those
receipts that are "electronically printed," and explicitly exempts
"transactions in which the sole means of recording a credit card
or debit card account number is by handwriting or by an imprint
11 Brandon McKelvey, Comment, Financial Institutions' Duty of Confidentiality
To Keep Customer's Personal Information Secure from the Threat of Identity Theft,
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1077, 1091 (2001) ("The limited protection of... the FCRA
has proved insufficient to prevent identity theft.").
6 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117
Stat. 1952 ("An Act [t]o amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act.") (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
51 149 CONG. REC. 21,708, 21,739 (2003) (statement of Rep. Michael Oxley).
U Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117
Stat. 1952 ("An Act ... to prevent identity theft. . . .") (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
59 S. REP. No. 108-166, at 3 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) ("The bill contains numerous
measures which protect consumers from identity thieves.").
60 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). FACTA also includes provisions
designed to better enable consumers to monitor credit, thereby helping to stifle the
effects of any identity theft. For instance, FACTA explicitly empowers consumers to
request and obtain one credit report per year from each of the three major credit-
reporting agencies free of charge, to enable consumers to monitor their reports so as
to ensure that no fraudulent activity has occurred. Id. § 1681j. In addition, under
another provision, consumers are able to create a fraud alert on their account, which
then mandates that the consumer be notified of any new credit activity, while
simultaneously requiring that the business processing the credit request take
"reasonable steps" to ensure the request is not fraudulent. Id. § 168ic-1. Moreover,
consumers are able to block any negative information resulting from fraud or
identity theft from their credit reports. Id. § 1681c-2. Finally, FACTA also provides
businesses with mandatory procedures for disposing of consumer credit information.
Id. § 1681w.
61 S. REP. No. 108-166, at 3 (2003) (Conf. Rep.).
62 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
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or copy of the card."63 Lastly, the provision contains a staggered
implementation schedule, providing that the provision would
become effective either "3 years after December 4, 2003" or "1
year after December 4, 2003," depending upon the date that the
"machine or device that electronically prints receipts for credit
card or debit card transactions" was put into use."
To further achieve its goal of preventing identity theft,
FACTA also terminated FCRA's preemption sunset provision,
with the result that regulation of consumer reporting agencies is
now permanently subject to federal preemption.65  FACTA also
explicitly provided that the provisions aimed at stifling identity
theft, most importantly the truncation provision, would similarly
be subject to permanent federal preemption.66 Echoing the
reasoning behind FCRA's 1996 amendments, Congress
explained that a uniform national system was the best way to
deal with identity theft since it is such a national concern.68 As
one Congressman noted, to not provide federal preemption on
this key provision would hurt consumers. More specifically the
Congressman queried, "what [would] happen with consumers
and businesses who [would] not know what State law applie[d]
and [would] find themselves caught in conflicting State
63 Id. § 1681c(g)(2).
64 Id. § 1681c(g)(3). For machines put into use before January 1, 2005, the three-
year grace period applied. Id. § 1681c(g)(3)(A). On the other hand, if a machine was
put into use on or after January 1, 2005, the merchant would only be allowed a one-
year grace period before compliance with the truncation provision would become
mandatory. Id. § 1681c(g)(3)(B).
65 Hillebrand, supra note 45, at 57; 149 CONG. REC. H12,219 (daily ed. Nov. 21,
2003) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski) ("If we fail to extend the expiring provisions of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act before the end of this year, conflicting state laws could
place financial institutions in a difficult compliance position. . . .").
6 H.R. REP. No. 108-263, at 26. ("The Committee's review of the FCRA's
expiring uniform national standards included extensive consideration of proposals
for assisting consumers in preventing identity theft... ."); 149 CONG. REC. H12,215
(daily ed. Nov. 21, 2003) (statement of Rep. Michael Oxley) ("[T]he uniform national
standards for identity theft were limited to the subject matters that the bill's
provisions actually address, such as fraud alerts, blocking bad credit information,
and truncating credit card account numbers at the point of sale." (emphasis added)).
67 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
- 149 CONG. REC. H12,215 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2003) (statement of Rep. Michael
Oxley).
69 149 CONG. REC. 21,708, 21,739 (2003) (statement of Rep. Michael Oxley)
("[Aillowing different State standards on key protections will hurt, not help,
consumers.").
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requirements that [could not] be adequately complied with."70 If
the truncation provision was not uniformly applicable
nationwide, it would water down the protections against identity
theft available to Americans.7 1  Therefore, FACTA explicitly
provided that the truncation provision will preempt state law
"with respect to the conduct required" by the provision itself.7 2
That is, the truncation provision creates a uniform national
standard for the actual conduct required thereunder, namely the
truncation of credit card account numbers on receipts.
FACTA piggybacks on the enforcement provisions of FCRA.74
FACTA provides that a consumer can recover any actual
damages, together with the costs of the litigation and reasonable
attorneys fees, sustained as a result of a negligent violation.75
However, if a consumer is able to prove a willful 6 violation of
FACTA, he or she can collect statutory damages of "not less than
$100 and not more than $1,000" per violation, along with the
costs of suit and punitive damages, without having to prove
actual injury.77 Notably, FACTA does not limit the amount of
damages recoverable in a class action brought under the Act."
As a result, the overwhelming majority of lawsuits brought under
FACTA are brought as class actions," given the relatively low
amount of statutory damages authorized and the commonality of
material facts amongst the class of plaintiffs.so
After FACTA was enacted, many of the initial class actions
being brought under the Act claimed willful violations of the
truncation provision as a result of a merchant's failure to
properly truncate the expiration date of the consumers' credit
cards.8 ' However, many of the merchants claimed that they
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681t(b)(5)(A) (West 2011).
7 Hillebrand, supra note 45, at 72.
74 LeCours, supra note 28, at 350.
75 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (2006).
76 The Supreme Court has determined that the statute's "willfulness"
requirement includes reckless disregard of the duty imposed by the statute. See
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 71 (2007).
1 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
78 Chaplin, supra note 35, at 311.
79 Id. ("The lion's share of the FACTA lawsuits have been filed as putative class
actions, which means that the litigant seeks relief on behalf of a class of individuals
that received receipts that contained more information than FACTA permits.").
so LeCours, supra note 28, at 342.
81 Fitterer, supra note 16, at 400.
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believed they were in compliance with the statute by truncating
the credit card account number.8 2 As a result, Congress enacted
the Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007
("CDCRCA") in order to resolve the ambiguity regarding the
provision." This amendment essentially provides merchants
with "one free bite at the apple," as it limits liability for
violations resulting from the inclusion of an improperly
truncated expiration date which occurred between the enactment
of FACTA and the enactment of the CDCRCA, but clarifies that
future inclusions of a card's expiration date will nonetheless
constitute a violation.'
II. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF "PRINT" AND THE
APPLICATION OF THE TRUNCATION PROVISION To ELECTRONIC
RECEIPTS
"[A]11 meanings, we know, depend on the key of interpretation."
- George Eliot"
The divergent viewpoints on the truncation provision's
applicability to e-receipts have emerged as a result of differing
interpretations of the term "print" in FACTA's truncation
provision. This Part will explore this conflict in more detail.
First, Part II.A. describes the arguments favoring the truncation
provision's application to online transactions, highlighting the
clearly defined underlying congressional intent of the truncation
provision as the case-in-chief argument of proponents of its
application to e-receipts. Then, Part II.B. surveys the arguments
against the provision's application to online transactions, noting
the prominence of the allegedly plain meaning of the provision's
language amidst the arguments made by opponents to the
provision's application to e-receipts.
8 Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241,
§ 2(a)(3), 122 Stat. 1565 (2008).
8 See id. § 2(b).
4 Chaplin, supra note 35, at 313 ("That is, the law appears to say: 'Okay, you
were wrong, but we won't count it against you-just don't do it again.' ").
8 1 GEORGE ELIOT, DANIEL DERONDA 56 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1900) (1876).
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A. A Purposivist Approach: FACTA's Truncation Provision
Applies to E-Receipts
"Woe to the makers of literal translations, who by rendering
every word weaken the meaning!" - Voltaire"
A California District Court recently had the opportunity to
address the issue of whether FACTA's truncation provision
applies to online receipts.87 In Vasquez-Torres v. Stubhub, Inc.
the court held that electronic receipts are subject to the
truncation provision.88 The plaintiff in Vasquez-Torres purchased
tickets from defendant Stubhub, Inc., 9 an online "fan-to-fan
ticket marketplace."90 The defendant provided the plaintiff with
an electronic receipt, which contained the expiration date of
plaintiffs credit or debit card.9' As a result, the plaintiff brought
a class-action suit under FACTA, claiming a violation of the
statute's truncation provision. 92 The defendant then moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, asserting that since it did not "print" the receipt under
any reasonable interpretation of the term, the truncation
provision was inapplicable to the transaction. The court
disagreed with the defendant, holding that electronic receipts do
fall within the truncation provision's domain.94 The court
explained that when the defendant asserted that the definition of
"print" was "to make an impression in or upon," it failed to
realize that this definition encompassed receipts displayed on a
consumer's computer screen, noting that when the defendant
sent the e-receipt to the plaintiff, it had "made an impression on
Plaintiffs [sic] computer screen."" Moreover, the court noted
that other definitions of "print," such as "to display on a surface
(as a computer screen) for viewing," clearly include electronic
86 ROBERT ANDREWS, THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 920 (1993).
8 Vasquez-Torres v. Stubhub, Inc., No. CV 07-1328, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63719, *6 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2007).
8 Id. at *6-9.
* See id. at *2.
90 About Us, STUBHUB.COM, https:Hwww.stubhub.com/about-us/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2013).
91 Vasquez-Torres, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63719, at *2.
92 Id. at *1-2.
9 Id. at *5.
94 Id. at *9.
95 Id. at *7 (internal quotation omitted).
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receipts." Finally, the court emphasized that a statute should be
interpreted in accordance with its legislative purpose." As
FACTA was enacted to prevent identity theft, a broad
interpretation of the term "print," so as to include e-receipts,
better comports with Congress' will." In addition, the court
noted that Congress had expressly provided for exceptions for
handwritten and imprinted receipts within the provision and
concluded that had Congress intended a similar exception to
apply to e-receipts, it would have similarly expressly provided
such an exception.99
1. Congressional Intent.
Others in the field agree with the California District Court's
reasoning and advocate for the truncation provision's application
to electronic receipts. 0 According to such advocates, it is the
congressional intent underlying the provision that dictates that
the provision should so apply.101 When interpreting a statute, the
"goal ... is to ascertain the intent of Congress in order to give
effect to its legislative will."10 2 Since the legislative will behind
FACTA's enactment was plainly stated by Congress as a desire to
help protect consumers against identity theft, 03 it seems likely
Congress intended to prevent all forms of identity theft and not
limit the statute's protections to the narrow subset of risks posed
by paper receipts.' 04
Proponents of the truncation provision's application to e-mail
receipts bolster their argument by highlighting the fact that
nothing in the text of the statute reveals that Congress intended
to exclude online receipts from the provision's domain.0" The
statute states that no merchant shall "print" more than the last
five digits or the expiration date of a consumer's credit or debit
card on an "electronically printed" receipt, "[e]xcept as otherwise
96 Id.
9 Id. at *8.
98 Id. at *8-9.
9 Id. at *9.
100 See, e.g., Grabein v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., No. 07-22235-CIV, 2008 WL
343179, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2008).
101 Vasquez-Torres, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63719, at *8.
102 See Alarcon v. Keller Indus. Inc., 27 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 1994).
10s Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117
Stat. 1952 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
'0 Vasquez-Torres, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63719, at *8-9.
105 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
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provided in [the provision] ."106 The statute goes on to state that
the subsection "shall not apply to transactions in which the sole
means of recording a credit card or debit card account number is
by handwriting or by an imprint or copy of the card."1o' Thus, it
appears that Congress created a broad rule with a narrow
exception. More specifically, when Congress decided that
handwritten and imprinted receipts were not to be included
within the truncation's domain, it made it clear that such
receipts were exempt under the truncation provision.'
However, Congress made no mention of electronic receipts or
confirmations being similarly excluded under the provision. 09
"[Hiad Congress desired such an exclusion, they would have
explicitly done so," as they did for handwritten and imprinted
receipts.110
According to proponents of this view, this reasoning is
reinforced in light of FACTA's remedial nature."' In enacting
FACTA, Congress intended to create a broad consumer protection
scheme to help remedy the damaging effects of identity theft."2
As a remedial statute, its protections should be broadly construed
and given liberal interpretation while its exceptions should be
read narrowly to affect only the remedy Congress intended."'
Such a broad reading would necessitate the inclusion of
electronic receipts within the truncation provision's protections.
106 Id. § 1681c(g).
107 Id.
108 Id. (Congress explicitly provided an exemption within the truncation
provision itself for "transactions in which the sole means of recording a credit card or
debit card account number is by handwriting or by an imprint or copy of the card.").
"0 See id. § 1681c.
110 Vasquez-Torres v. Stubhub, Inc., No. CV 07-1328, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63719, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2007).
I See Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 716 (9th Cir. 2010)
("[Wie must examine FACTA to determine whether the denial of class certification is
consistent with congressional intent and FACTA's remedial scheme...." (emphasis
added)).
112 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
us See Piedmont & N. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 286 U.S. 299,
311-12 (1932) ("The Transportation Act was remedial legislation, and should
therefore be given a liberal interpretation ... but for the same reason exemptions
from its sweep should be narrowed and limited to effect the remedy intended.").
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2. Statutory Language
Proponents of the truncation provision's application to online
transactions also cite the language of the statute itself as
evidence that an emphasis on the congressional intent
underlying the statute in the interpretation process does not
circumvent an application of the specific words chosen by
Congress.114  Since FACTA does not explicitly define "print,"
courts must construe the term so as to give effect to its ordinary
meaning and can look to dictionaries when determining a term's
ordinary meaning." 5 One of the typical definitions of the word
"print," which is often used to help exclude e-receipt's from the
truncation provision, is "to make an impression, in or upon."'16 It
is argued that an e-receipt or online confirmation does in fact
"ma[kle an impression" on the computer screen upon which it is
displayed."' Therefore, such e-receipts fall within the ordinary
meaning of the term "print.""8 Furthermore, other definitions of
"print" expressly include things like displays on a computer
screen or other surface within the ordinary meaning of the
term."19
Nonetheless, even if a court finds that the more plausible
meaning of "print" is such as to preclude the inclusion of
electronic receipts, advocates of the provision's application to
e-mail receipts contend that, in light of the interpretation above,
it is not the only reasonable interpretation of the term.12 0
Therefore, it is maintained that the term "print" is sufficiently
ambiguous so as to justify consideration of FACTA's purpose and
legislative history to resolve the ambiguity.121 Based on the clear
legislative will,12 2 such advocates maintain that the truncation
provision should apply to Internet transactions. To hold
otherwise would be a frustration of the statute's clearly stated
purpose of preventing identity theft.
114 See Vasquez-Torres, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63719, at *6-7.
"6 Id.
116 Id. at *7.
117 Id.
118 See id.
H9 Id. ("defining 'print' as 'to display on a surface (as a computer screen) for
viewing'") (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 924 (10th ed.
2002)).
120 See supra notes 87-118 and accompanying text.
121 See Colon v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 319 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2003).
122 See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
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3. Policy
Proponents of this view also note that the inclusion of
electronic receipts within FACTA's domain is further supported
by common sense and policy reasoning. Online commerce's
prevalence was well established in 2003123 when Congress was
drafting and considering FACTA.124 Therefore, it seems unlikely
that Congress would have desired the statute's protections to
apply to face-to-face transactions and not to online transactions
in a world where the former are becoming more and more
obsolete while the latter are continuing to have a growing impact
on our economy. 12 5 In fact, the legislative history reveals that
Congress was duly aware of the impact that the Internet has had
on identity theft, making it much easier for potential fraudsters
to access consumer information.126 Further, one of the mischiefs
Congress sought to remedy by its enactment of the truncation
provision was dumpster diving.127 The Internet is the modern-
day dumpster, where modern-day identity thieves turn to access
an unwary consumer's personal information.12 8 As a result of
identity thieves hacking into various consumer websites, online
transactions pose an even greater risk of interception by an
identity thief during a transaction than does the physical
handling of a paper receipt. Therefore, to find FACTA's
truncation provision inapplicable to e-receipts would be to
weaken the strong consumer protections intended by Congress. 12 9
This seemingly contradictory result is exacerbated in a world
where online transactions are continuing to increase in
proportion to in-person transactions.3 o
123 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2003 E-STATS 1 (May 11, 2005) [hereinafter "2003 E-
STATS"], available at http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2003/2003finaltext.pdf.
124 See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159,
117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
125 See 2003 E-STATS, supra note 123.
126 See e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S13,856 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Jim Bunning) ("The internet is making it easier for thieves to access consumer
information.").
127 Id. ("[Tihe bill contains strong identity theft and privacy protections ... that
will help prevent thieves who go 'dumpster diving' or try to steal credit reports from
mail boxes.").
128 Voros, supra note 20.
129 See 149 CONG. REC. 21,708, 21,739 (2003) (statement of Rep. Michael Oxley)
(limiting FACTA to paper receipts would result in the "weakening [of] the national
credit system and [the] undercutting [of] the uniform consumer protections this bill
provides....").
13o Schottmiller et al., supra note 10, at 1.
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In addition, proponents of this view contend that FACTA's
truncation provision must apply to electronic receipts in order to
avoid undermining the statute's goal of creating a uniform
national system to help prevent identity theft.'' FACTA
permanently extended the preemption provisions of the FCRA
and explicitly included the truncation provision within the realm
of federal preemption.13 2  Congress specifically noted that the
provisions of FACTA aimed to combat identity theft were
deserving of a uniform standard because "identity theft is a
national concern, not only because of its impact . .. but because it
knows no boundaries."3 3 The ubiquitous threat of identity theft
is aggravated by a system of electronic commerce that similarly
knows no bounds, as the parties to any given online transaction
are often in different states, if not different countries. If the
federal truncation provision does not apply to these transactions,
they will be governed by the truncation laws of the states in
which the transactions take place.134 This would create the very
chaotic state of affairs that the FCRA's preemption provision was
meant to avoid.135 On one side, it would leave consumers unsure
whether their credit or debit card information and data are
safe.' On the other side, merchants would be left to the mercy
of the varying laws of the states, being forced to comply with the
potentially incompatible laws of each state in which it does
in See Vasquez-Torres v. Stubhub, Inc., No. CV 07-1328 PSG, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 63719, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2007).
132 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681t(b)(5)(A) (West 2011).
133 149 CONG. REC. H12,215 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2003) (statement of Rep. Michael
Oxley).
"I See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.09 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.0118
(West 2003).
135 See 149 CONG. REC. H12,215 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Michael Oxley).
136 See 149 CONG. REC. 21,708, 21,739 (Sept. 10, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Michael Oxley) ("[Aillowing different State standards on key protections will hurt,
not help, consumers.").
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business over the Internet."a7 The creation of such chaos seems
contrary to the expressed goals of creating a uniform national
standard in order to prevent identity theft.
Finally, in response to the argument that the availability of
statutory damages for a violation of FACTA's truncation
provision results in crippling effects for many businesses and
that limiting the statute's applicability to paper receipts would
help to minimize such ill effects, proponents of the provision's
application to e-receipts maintain that Congress has already
weighed such harms and determined that "the penalty fits the
'crime.' "138 These proponents reiterate that the statute's purpose
is to prevent identity theft. It would be contradictory to
achieving this purpose if the statute's regulatory scheme
required plaintiffs to actually become victims of identity theft in
order to bring suit under the statute.13 9 Rather, since the policy
of preventing identity theft is "sufficiently important to protect, a
forceful regulatory scheme is necessary to assure compliance
[and] [t]he penalty must be large enough to remove the incentive
to disregard or disobey it."40 Moreover, the Internet has
revolutionized business, making it cheaper and easier for
companies to access a broad consumer base. However, it can only
function if consumers remain confident in the security of their
credit information. It follows that, despite the risk of large
damages being awarded for violations of the truncation provision
in online transactions, online merchants stand to benefit from
increased business due to consumer confidence in the security of
their credit card account information.
1' For example, Oregon's statute states that a merchant cannot "create" a
receipt showing "more information about a customer than the customer's name and
five digits of the customer's credit or debit card number." OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 646A.204 (West 2007). In contrast, the Illinois statute seems broad enough to
be read to apply to internet transactions, providing that a merchant cannot "print or
otherwise produce or reproduce or permit the printing or other production or
reproduction of. . . any part of the credit card or debit card account number, other
than the last 4 digits . . . ." 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2NN(b) (West 2011).
'3 LeCours, supra note 28, at 350. "Congress has concluded, albeit implicitly,
that even the largest penalty within the range is appropriate for any qualifying
violation." Id. at 351.
"I Id. at 354.
140 Id.
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B. A Textualist Approach: FACTA's Truncation Provision Does
Not Apply to E-Receipts
"How strangely will the Tools of a Tyrant pervert the plain
Meaning of Words!" - Samuel Adams.
Recently, the Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to address
the issue of whether FACTA's truncation provision applies to the
Internet. In Shlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. ,142 a case of
first impression at the federal appellate level, 14 3 the court held
that the provision does not apply to electronic receipts and
confirmations.'" In Shlahtichman, the plaintiff Eduard
Shlahtichman went onto the defendant 1-800 Contacts's145
website to purchase contact lenses with his credit card.14 6
Shlahtichman received an automatically generated e-mail
confirmation of the order that same day and noticed that the
e-receipt included the expiration date of the credit card that he
had used to make the purchase. 147  As a result, Shlahtichman
filed a class-action suit against 1-800 Contacts under FACTA,
alleging that the defendant's inclusion of the expiration date
constituted a willful violation of FACTA's truncation provision,
and sought statutory damages. 4 s 1-800 Contacts moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, arguing that e-receipts and confirmations
do not fall within the purview of the truncation provision. 4 9 The
court agreed with the defendant and held that e-receipts are
outside the scope of FACTA's truncation provision.'50 The court
explained that the plain meaning of the term "print" clearly
141 Letter from Samuel Adams to John Pitts (Jan. 21, 1776), available at
http://www.revolutionary-war-and-beyond.com/samuel-adams-quotes-2.html.
142 Shlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2010).
14 Note that even more recently, the Ninth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit to
hold that FACTA's truncation provision does not apply to receipts that are "sent to a
customer's email account and then displayed on a screen." Simonoff v. Expedia, Inc.,
643 F.3d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 2011).
1 Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 796.
14 1-800 Contacts is the world's largest contact lens store, selling contact lenses
by phone, the internet, mail, and fax. Company Information, 1-800 CONTACTS.COM,
http://www.1800contacts.com/ExternalRelations/TheCompany.aspx (last visited
Mar. 1, 2013).
.46 Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 796.
14 Id.
14 Id. at 797.
.49 See id.
15o Id. at 796.
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conveys that the provision is limited to physical receipts.'"' The
court noted that this conclusion is further supported when
viewed within the context of the statute as a whole and in
conjunction with Congress' failure to explicitly provide for the
provision's application to e-receipts when it has unequivocally
done so in other statutes. 15 2
1. Statutory Language
Other courts and commentators in the field agree with the
Seventh Circuit and argue that the truncation provision is not
applicable to online transactions. According to these courts and
commentators, the plain language of the statute clearly indicates
that the provision's applicability is limited to tangible paper
receipts. 53  That is, according to a well-established principle of
statutory interpretation, the first step in a case involving
statutory construction is an examination of the statute's
language itself,154 and if the language is plain, courts must give
effect to the statute's ordinary and natural meaning. 5 5
Moreover, if the statute leaves a key term undefined, it is
presumed that Congress intended the term to carry its ordinary
meaning.'5 6 Accordingly, in such situations, courts look to the
common or natural meaning of the term, and many courts have
noted that "[d]ictionaries are a helpful resource in ascertaining
the common meaning of terms that a statute leaves undefined."5
Finally, when seeking to establish the ordinary meaning of a
term, courts must consider the meaning of the word "in the
context of the statutory scheme in which [it] appear[s]."'
Applying these rules of statutory construction, proponents of
the view that the truncation provision does not apply to
e-receipts contend that the truncation provision covers only
tangible printed receipts and does not apply to onscreen displays
151 Id. at 799.
152 Id. at 800-02.
153 See, e.g., Narson v. Godaddy.com, Inc., No. CV-08-0177-PHX-SRB, 2008 WL
2790211, at *6 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2008); Fitterer, supra note 16, at 604-05.
154 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
" Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6
(2000).
156 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000).
65 Shlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 794, 799 (7th Cir. 2010).
158 Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 420 (2005).
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of information.' The statute states that no merchant that
accepts credit or debit cards shall "print" a receipt that includes
more than the last five digits of the card number or the
expiration date thereupon, but does not provide a definition for
the term "print."16 0 The argument is that, as used in the statute,
to "print" a receipt generally or ordinarily means to record the
receipt's information on paper and that "when one refers to a
printed receipt, what springs to mind is a tangible document."16 1
Moreover, such proponents note that the majority of dictionaries
confirm this ordinary meaning of the term, noting that when
used in its "transitive verb" form, the term print "ordinarily
connotes the transfer of words or images to a tangible medium-
often paper."162
Next, opponents of the truncation provision's application to
online transactions assert that as "[s]tatutory language only has
meaning in context,"' 3 FACTA's statutory context confirms that
the use of the term print was meant to limit the provision's
application to physical receipts.'"' According to section
1681c(g)(1), the truncation requirement applies only to receipts
"provided to the cardholder at the point of sale or transaction."6 s
These opponents contend that such language clearly
contemplates a transaction occurring at a physical brick-and-
mortar type of location where the seller actually provides the
tangible, physical receipt to the customer.'6 6
119 Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 798-802.
160 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
161 Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 799.
162 Id. (citing Oxford English Dictionary Online, Merriam-Webster Dictionary
Online, and Dictionary.com). However, in a recent interpretive exercise by the
Seventh Circuit, the court noted that the same dictionaries also recognize that the
term can also "be understood to mean the display of text on a computer's viewing
screen." Id. Nonetheless, the court noted that this meaning of the term, while
increasing in usage in recent years, had not yet reached the level of an "ordinary or
natural meaning of 'print.' " Id.
'6 Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel.
Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 415 (2005).
164 Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 800. See also Turner v. Ticket Animal, LLC, No.
08-61038-CIV, 2009 WL 1035241, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2009) ("The terms 'point
of the sale' and 'any cash register or other machine or device' immediately evoke the
image of a paper receipt.").
165 § 1681c(g)(1) (emphasis added).
'6 Narson v. Godaddy.com, Inc., No. CV-08-0177-PHX-SRB, 2008 WL 2790211,
at *5 (D. Ariz. 2008).
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Further, even if a point of sale can be established for an
online transaction, two other sections of the statute reinforce the
notion that the provision only applies to traditional in-store
transactions with paper receipts.167  First, section 1681c(g)(2)
further limits the truncation provision's application to
"electronically printed" receipts and expressly eliminates receipts
generated by "handwriting or by an imprint or copy of the
card."'68  Once more, the argument is that this language
seemingly evokes the understanding that the provision applies to
tangible paper receipts, as it discusses only means of physical
transfer of a card's information to a tangible medium. 169
Second, in section 1681c(g)(3), Congress provided two
different dates for when the truncation provision went into effect,
which were based on the date that the "cash register or other
machine or device that electronically prints receipts" went into
use.170  Applying ejusdem generis, a canon of statutory
interpretation,'71 opponents to the truncation provision's
application to online transactions note that based on the term
"cash register" being used as a lead example, "other machine or
device" should be interpreted as meaning only such machines or
devices that print receipts at a physical location, reasoning that
"few terms bring to mind a store better than 'cash register.' "172
Moreover, these opponents note that the differing dates in
section 1681c(g)(3) only work together as an effective
implementation scheme if the provision's application is limited to
receipts printed on paper by a cash register or similar device. 73
If the provision applied to e-receipts, the "machine" in question
would be the personal computer of the consumer.' 4  Such an
167 See § 1681c(g)(2)-(3).
168 Id. § 1681c(g)(2).
169 Narson, 2008 WL 2790211, at *5.
170 § 1681c(g)(3) (emphasis added).
"1 In describing the canon's application, the Supreme Court has stated that
"where general words follow a specific enumeration of persons or things, the general
words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically
enumerated." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981).
172 Shlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 794, 800 (7th Cir. 2010).
However, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that as a growing number of businesses
now use the same type of computer that consumers use in their homes to generate
receipts at their brick-and-mortar stores, the line between a cash register and
personal computers is blurring. Id.
173 Id. at 800-01.
174 Id. at 801.
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application would make the effective date of the provision
dependent on a fact entirely outside of the control of the
merchant, namely the date that the consumer's personal
computer went into use. 75 Therefore, proponents of this view
maintain that Congress would not have premised a merchant's
liability under the provision on circumstances entirely outside of
its control. 176
Therefore, opponents to the provision's application to online
transactions argue that when taken as a whole, it is clear that
the truncation provision is meant to apply only to physical, paper
receipts. 177 As a result, they argue the plain language of the
provision makes it clear that it does not apply to online receipts
displayed onscreen which may later be printed by the
consumer.1 78 Since the plain meaning rule dictates that "when
the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at
least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-is
to enforce it according to its terms,"179 proponents of this view
note that courts must dismiss any action brought under the
truncation provision that is based on a non-tangible, electronic
receipt. 180
2. Congressional Intent
While the plain language argument holds the weight of the
rationale for the view that the truncation provision does not
apply to online transactions, proponents of this view also cite
congressional intent to further validate their viewpoint.' Such
proponents point to legislative history that reveals that FACTA's
truncation provision was passed in order to combat
17 Id.
17 Id.
177 Narson v. Godaddy.com, Inc., No. CV-08-0177-PHX-SRB, 2008 WL 2790211,
at *6 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2008).
178 Id.
179 Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6
(2000) (internal quotations omitted).
18o See, e.g., Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 796. In further strengthening their
position, opponents note that this understanding of the plain meaning of the term
"print," and the inapplicability of the provision to online receipts, is in line with a
majority of courts that have addressed the issue to date. Id. at 798. However, the
interpretation is not unanimous, as a minority of courts have concluded that "print"
and the truncation provision should be read to encompass electronic receipts that
are displayed on the consumer's computer screen. Id.
181 See id. at 801-02.
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misappropriation of paper receipts through low-technical identity
theft techniques such as "dumpster diving."' 2 While those
adhering to this viewpoint concede that e-receipts can also be
misappropriated by identity thieves, they maintain that paper
receipts pose "unique, if not greater, dangers," especially in terms
of the low-technical identity theft techniques the statute was
designed to protect against.8 3 That is, a physical paper receipt
that a consumer obtains at the point of sale is much more apt to
being inadvertently discarded by the consumer in any number of
places where a potential identity thief can gain access to it.'8 4 On
the other hand, electronic receipts do not possess those
characteristics that cause paper receipts to be vulnerable to such
misappropriation, unless consumers print the receipts on their
own.'8 5  Opponents of the provision's application to online
transactions contend that Congress likely thought it more
appropriate to address the specific concerns surrounding online
identity theft to other statutory provisions that specifically deal
with the concerns of misuse for online data and information.186
Opponents of the truncation provision's application to e-mail
receipts also look to the language Congress did not include within
FACTA's truncation provision for further evidence that Congress
intended the provision to cover only paper receipts. Specifically,
they note that "where Congress knows how to say something but
chooses not to, its silence is controlling.""' Such opponents
highlight that electronic commerce was prevalent in 2003 when
FACTA was enacted, as Internet retail sales topped fifty-six
182 See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S13,856 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Bunning) ("[Tihe bill contains strong identity theft and privacy protections .. . that
will help prevent thieves who go 'dumpster diving' or try to steal credit reports from
mail boxes.").
18 Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 802-03.
184 Id. at 802.
18 See id. at 802-03.
18 Id. at 803. For example, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
deals exclusively with electronic communications and criminalizes the unauthorized
interception of such communications, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008),
and the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records
Access Act of 1986 specifically authorizes a victim of unauthorized, intentional
access to communications held in electronic storage to bring suit, 18 U.S.C. § 2701(2006).
187 In re Griffith, 206 F.3d 1389, 1394 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations
omitted).
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billion dollars that year in the United States.188  Nevertheless,
Congress made no mention of the Internet in the truncation
provision, nor did it do so in another provision in the Act.18 In
comparison, elsewhere Congress has explicitly provided for the
application of a provision to electronic media and transactions. 90
Therefore, "[iin view of such statutory provisions, it is reasonable
to expect that Congress would have used similar terminology had
it meant to reach electronic receipts viewed or printed by the
consumer."' 9
Nonetheless, opponents of the truncation provision's
application to e-receipts recognize that requiring its application
to electronic receipts would undoubtedly be consistent with the
overall purpose of FACTA to combat identity theft.9 2 However,
these opponents remain steadfastly committed to the notion that
courts cannot ignore the "unambiguous language of the statute in
order to further Congress's expressed purpose in enacting the
statute."93 In light of their view that the language of the
provision clearly dictates that its application is limited to
physical receipts, such opponents contend that to include
e-receipts within the provision's domain would be to "broaden the
statute's reach beyond the words that Congress actually used."94
188 2003 E-Stats, supra note 123, at 4; see also Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 801
(discussing the absence of terms such as "Internet" or "email" from FACTA despite
the prevalence of electronic transactions in 2003).
189 Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 801.
190 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008,
15 U.S.C. § 1278(c)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) ("Any advertisement by a retailer,
manufacturer, importer, distributor, or private labeler (including advertisements on
Internet websites or in catalogues or other printed materials) that provides a direct
means for the purchase or order of a product for which a cautionary statement is
required under subsection (a) or (b) shall include the appropriate cautionary
statement displayed on or immediately adjacent to that advertisement. . .."
(emphasis added)); see also Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 801.
19 Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 802.
192 Id.
193 Id.; see also Morrison v. Natl Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct 2869, 2886 (2010)
("It is our function to give the statute the effect its language suggests, however
modest that may be; not to extend it to admirable purposes it might be used to
achieve.").
19 Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 802.
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3. Policy
Next, opponents of the provision's application to e-receipts
also contend that limiting the truncation provision's application
to paper receipts would be in line with public policy, as it would
help protect business from crippling liability. FACTA does not
impose a ceiling on the amount of statutory damages recoverable
in a lawsuit brought as a result of a violation of the truncation
provision.' Therefore, there is real potential for absolutely
devastating total damages in class action lawsuits. 9 6 One court
estimated that given a potential class of plaintiffs of 2.9 million
people, "statutory damages alone would range from a minimum
of $290 million to a maximum of $2.9 billion."' These damages
are often greater than the net worth of a business. 98 Moreover,
the damaging effects may be magnified even further given the
expansive customer base that many online retailers enjoy,'99
thereby further exacerbating the crippling effects FACTA
liability could have on businesses. The debilitating effects seem
even more devastating in light of the fact that most FACTA
lawsuits do not allege actual consumer harm.2 0 0  Therefore,
limiting FACTA's application to paper receipts is necessary to
help minimize these negative effects on business, by removing
the risk of liability under FACTA's truncation provision for its
online transactions.
According to proponents of this view, limiting FACTA's
applicability also serves consumers.2 0 1 While identity theft
experts have noted that the truncation of credit and debit card
numbers does accomplish FACTA's stated purpose of preventing
identity theft, FACTA lawsuits, most often in the form of class
actions seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in statutory
damages, rarely allege actual consumer harm.20 2 However, if the
195 LeCours, supra note 28, at 344.
196 Chaplin, supra note 35, at 311.
" See Lopez v. KB Toys Retail, Inc., No. CV 07-144-JFW, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82025, at *14 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2007).
198 Chaplin, supra note 35, at 311. See also Lopez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82025,
at *14.
9 See Schottmiller et al., supra note 10, at 2.
200 See CONG. REC. E925 (daily ed. May 14, 2008) (statement of Rep. Maloney),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2008-05-14/pdflCREC-2008-05-14-
ptl-PgE925-2.pdf.
201 Id.
202 Id.
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truncation provision applies to Internet transactions, thereby
exacerbating the crippling effects on business, consumers would
in fact be harmed.2 03 Specifically, consumers would face higher
prices and less competition as businesses, many of which can
only function as a result of the low operating costs of conducting
their business online,2 04 are forced to close their doors and shut
down operations because they cannot afford their resulting
litigation costs. 2 05 Therefore, limiting the truncation provision to
physical receipts would help to alleviate this negative effect on
consumers.
Finally, opponents of FACTA's application to online
transactions argue that extending federal preemption to this
area only serves to hinder consumer rights.2 06 More specifically,
"federal preemption stymies the development of new consumer
protections to respond to both old and new credit related
problems."20 7  This result occurs because state legislatures are
often better able to respond to emerging consumer issues than is
Congress.2 08 If electronic receipts are deemed outside the domain
of FACTA, the states will maintain their ability to more
effectively moderate the consumer protection issues that arise in
such contexts.209
203 Id.
204 See Schottmiller et al., supra note 10, at 1.
205 See CONG. REC. E925 (daily ed. May 14, 2008) (statement of Rep. Maloney),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2008-05-14/pdflCREC- 20
0 8-05-14-
ptl-PgE925-2.pdf.
20 Hillebrand, supra note 45, at 59.
207 Id.
2 Id. (noting that many of FACTA's provisions were largely based on existing
state consumer protection statutes).
209 See id.
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III. FACTA's TRUNCATION PROVISION APPLIES TO ELECTRONIC
RECEIPTS, RENDERING CHANGES TO THE ACT'S STATUTORY
DAMAGES PROvIsION NECESSARY
"Being right half the time beats being half right all the time." -
Malcolm Forbes210
FACTA's truncation provision has spawned substantial
litigation.2 1 ' The existence of this litigation and the conflicting
outcomes of many of these cases as to whether the provision
applies to online receipts seemingly make but one thing clear:
The language of the statute is not so "clear and unambiguous" as
some have contended. 212  Given this ambiguity, it becomes
appropriate and necessary to look beyond the plain meaning of
the provision in order to ascertain its meaning.2 13 Such an
endeavor illustrates that the provision as written should apply to
online receipts. More specifically, FACTA's underlying
legislative purpose, the language of the statute, and public policy
considerations all support the provision's application to
e-receipts. However, applying the provision to online
transactions may increase the crippling effects the statute
potentially inflicts upon businesses. That is, if the provision is
applied to e-receipts, the potential pool of class action plaintiffs
will likely increase for most business defendants, as many online
merchants enjoy larger customer bases than the average brick
and mortar retailer, thanks to the vast reach of the Internet. As
a result, the potential awards for aggregated statutory damages
in such class action situations stand to reach astronomical
amounts. Such debilitating effects could not have been intended
or anticipated by Congress. Therefore, steps should be taken to
avoid unduly harsh penalties for technical violations of the
provision.
This Part will explore each of these points in more detail.
First, Part III.A. demonstrates why FACTA's truncation
provision should be interpreted so as to apply to online receipts
by vindicating the purposivist arguments made by advocates of
this position. This Part goes on to provide further support for the
210 Malcolm Forbes, Thoughts On The Business Of Life, FORBES,
http://thoughts.forbes.com/thoughts/right-malcolm-forbes-being-right-half (last
visited Mar. 1, 2013).
211 Chaplin, supra note 35, at 311.
212 See supra Part II.
213 See Colon v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 319 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2003).
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provision's application to electronic receipts by way of the
language of the statute and public policy. Second, Part III.B.
begins by explaining why the statutory damages provision should
not be eliminated in its entirety and proposes that Congress
amend the provision so as to limit the maximum class action
liability for a violation of the truncation provision.
A. Purposivism Vindicated: Online Receipts Are Subject to
FACTA's Truncation Provision
"To know the laws is not to memorize their letter but to grasp
their full force and meaning." - Marcus Tullius Cicero214
Despite suggestions to the contrary,21 5 the truncation
provision should apply to online receipts. FACTA's underlying
legislative purpose, the statutory language itself, and overall
public policy considerations all support the provision's
application to e-receipts.
Much of the controversy surrounding the truncation
provision's application to online transactions stems from
divergent interpretations of the term "print."2 16 The existence of
this controversy knocks the wind out of the argument that the
provision's language is "clear and unambiguous," and renders it
appropriate to look to FACTA's legislative purpose to determine
the term's meaning.1 As a result, it becomes apparent that
those advocating for the truncation provision's application to
e-receipts are correct in their interpretation of the term. Most
notably, Congress made sure its intent behind FACTA was clear
by explicitly including the statute's purpose, namely to prevent
identity theft, within the Act itself.2 18 Commentators have noted
the "very real and tangible risk" that untruncated e-receipts pose
for consumers, especially as such receipts are often held in a
consumer's e-mail inbox indefinitely and can be retrieved in a
matter of seconds using the archive and search functions
214 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Quotes, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://quotes.dictionary.com/Toknowthe_lawsisnotto-memorize (last visited
Mar. 1, 2013).
215 See supra Part II.B.
216 See supra Part II.
217 See Colon, 319 F.3d at 917.
218 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117
Stat. 1952 ("An Act [tlo amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act, to prevent identity
theft. . . ." (emphasis added)) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
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provided by most major e-mail service providers. 21 9 As a result,
interpreting the term "print" so as to exclude online receipts from
the truncation provision would frustrate the Act's purpose, as it
would subject consumers to greater risks of identity theft rather
than helping protect them against it.
In addition, the language of the statute further supports the
provision's application to online transactions. However, this
language has been largely untapped by proponents of its
application to e-receipts. That is, most courts and commentators
have focused on the term "print" in determining the application
of the truncation provision to online transactions. 2 20 However,
the statute explicitly provides that the provision applies to
"electronically printed" receipts.2 2 ' By overlooking or not
emphasizing "electronically" in their analyses, courts and
commentators have violated the basic principle of statutory
interpretation that courts should "give effect . .. to every clause
and word of a statute"22 2 "so as to avoid rendering [a term]
superfluous."2 23 Adherence to this principle seemingly requires
that the term "electronically" provide meaning to the provision.
Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the meaning of the
term "electronically printed." However, just as Congress did not
provide a definition for "print" within FACTA, it similarly left
"electronically printed" undefined by the statute.2 24 According to
the principle of statutory interpretation often cited by opponents
of the truncation provision's application to online transactions,
when a key term has been left undefined by a statute, it will be
presumed that Congress intended the term to carry its ordinary
meaning.225 We therefore must determine the ordinary meaning
of "electronically printed."
219 Fitterer, supra note 16, at 605.
220 See supra Part II. Courts and commentators have generally limited their
reliance on the term "electronically printed" to providing secondary support to their
arguments. See id.
221 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
222 Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883).
223 Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991).
224 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
225 Shlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2010).
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"Electronically printed" is a contemporary term used in a
twenty-first century modernization of an older statute. It refers
to much more than the transferring of information onto paper.2 26
Rather, it encompasses electronic books, newspapers, and
journals, 227 all generated electronically and later displayed
digitally. Therefore, given that Congress enacted FACTA in
2003, in an age where the Internet, online newspapers, and
online shopping were commonplace, an application of the
ordinary and natural meaning of the term "electronically
printed" necessitates the provision's application to e-receipts that
are electronically generated by the merchant and displayed
digitally on the consumer's computer screen. Moreover, the Act
goes on to exclude two types of traditional "printing" from the
truncation provision, namely handwritten and imprinted
receipts, 22 8 and further excludes any receipt not involving a cash
register or "other machine,"229 further evidencing Congress'
intention of a modern interpretation of the term "electronically
printed."
Although the Act further limits the provision's application to
receipts provided "at the point of sale,"23 0 this does not render the
provision inapplicable to electronic receipts. While opponents to
the provision's application to online receipts contend that a point
of sale is nearly impossible to establish for an online
transaction,2 3 1 such a location could easily be the place where the
order is received and processed and/or where the e-receipt is
created. In fact, one court specifically rejected the notion that
point of sale denotes a "precise location within a store."23 2
Moreover, the staggered implementation schedule provided
by the Act does not inhibit the application of the truncation
provision to online transactions. The Act provides that the
provision's effective date is dependent upon the year in which the
226 See, e.g., Electronic Printing, THE CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE DESIGN,
http://www.cfsd.org.uk/PSS/Ex-ElectronicNewspaper.htm (last visited Mar 1, 2013)
(describing various types of electronic printing).
227 Id.
228 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(2).
229 See id. § 1681c(g)(3).
230 Id. § 1681c(g)(1).
211 Shlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 794, 800 (7th Cir. 2010).
232 Ehrheart v. Bose Corp., No. 07-350, 2008 WL 64491, at *3-5 (W.D. Pa. Jan.
4, 2008).
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machine that electronically prints the receipts went into use.2 3
It has been contended that if the truncation provision applied to
online transactions, the implementation provision would become
nonsensical, making the merchant's potential liability contingent
upon the date the customer obtained a personal computer.2 3 4
However, that is simply not the case. Rather, if the "electronic
printing" is deemed to occur when the merchant generates the
receipt, it is the merchant's computer that controls, not the
consumer's device that merely receives and displays the
e-receipt.
Lastly, policy considerations serve as further support for the
truncation provision's application to online transactions.
Requiring online merchants to truncate credit and debit card
receipts in accordance with FACTA's truncation provision and
subjecting online merchants to liability for violations of the
provision does not inflict an undue burden on them. Complying
with the truncation provision is relatively easy and inexpensive
for online merchants. 235  All it takes is a revision to the
programming code that generates the e-receipts and
confirmations. 236  For many online merchants, a free download
from their service provider is all that would be necessary in order
to be fully compliant with the provision.2 37
Moreover, concluding that online transactions are outside of
the truncation provision's domain would put consumers at a
disadvantage to the identity thief. As Verizon's Executive
Director of Corporate Marketing noted, "[alfter years of Internet
scams, today's online shoppers have become much more savvy-
but, unfortunately, so have the bad guys." 2 38 Without requiring
that merchants truncate e-receipts, consumers will be at the
mercy of potential fraudsters, combing the Internet for their next
victim, as an improperly truncated receipt has all the
information they would need to perpetrate identity theft.
233 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(3).
234 See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
235 Fitterer, supra note 16, at 605.
236 Id.
237 See, e.g., Account Truncation Law, MERCHANT SOURCE,
http*//www.merchantsource.com/truncation.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
238 Verizon, Verizon Offers Tips to Protect Personal Data While Making Online
Purchases, PR NEWSWIRE, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cyber-monday-
alert-stay-safe-while-shopping-online-this-holiday-season-72597482.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2013).
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Therefore, contrary to the suggestions otherwise, the
truncation provision should apply to online transactions and
e-mail receipts. FACTA's underlying purpose, its language, and
policy considerations all support this conclusion.
B. FACTA's Statutory Damages Provision Should Be Amended
To Limit a Merchant's Maximum Class Action Liability
"Why then, can one desire too much of a good thing?" - William
Shakespeare.2 39
Statutory damages are a necessary and proper relief for a
violation of FACTA's truncation provision. Statutory damages
promote compliance with the provision without requiring that
consumers fall victim to identity theft before having the incentive
to vindicate their interest through litigation, a result that would
frustrate the purpose of the Act itself. However, given the
debilitating effects that the provision's application stands to
inflict on online merchants, Congress should limit the maximum
class action liability for violations of the provision.
Opponents of the truncation provision's application to online
transactions often bolster their argument by noting the
potentially debilitating effects that the application of the
provision has on business.2 40 As damages of $100 to $1,000 are
recoverable for each violation of the provision, and the statute
does not cap the amount of statutory damages recoverable in a
class action, the damages in class action lawsuits brought under
the provision are often greater than the net worth of a
business. 2 4 1 This supposed undue hardship is worsened by the
fact that most of these lawsuits do not allege consumer harm.24 2
Moreover, this burden would be exacerbated if the truncation
provision applied to online transactions, as most online
merchants enjoy larger customer bases than brick-and-mortar
stores, creating an even greater pool of potential class action
plaintiffs, and a larger potential liability.2 43
239 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS You LIKE IT act 4, sc. 1.
240 See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
243 See, e.g., Schottmiller et al., supra note 10.
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However, this argument is fundamentally flawed. Statutory
damages, "like the regulations to which they give force, are
products of legislative determinations."2 " As such, it is not up to
the courts to evade proper application of the statute if results
would be onerous on business-the appropriate resolution is not
judicial fiat.2 4 5 Rather, in providing for statutory damages for a
willful 2 46 violation of the truncation provision, Congress has
already decided that the punishment fits the crime.24 7 More
specifically, Congress has decided that even damages at the
highest end of the allowable range, namely $1,000 per violation,
are appropriate given the risk of identity theft of an improperly
truncated receipt.24 8 Therefore, if such onerous results for
business were not fully anticipated by Congress, then it should
be left to Congress to amend the statute's penalty provisions.2 49
In the meantime, however, "[wihile a statute remains on the
books ... it must be enforced rather than subverted."2 5 0
Statutory damages are designed to create interests worth
protecting through litigation in situations where the actual or
measurable harm is very small."' As a result, "statutory
penalties provide remedies for the private consumer that it would
be unlikely (or unable) to pursue otherwise."252 Where the
statutorily regulated activity is one against public policy,
incentives to litigate serve as an effective enforcement
mechanism.25 3 Therefore, statutory damages not only sanction
244 LeCours, supra note 28, at 328.
245 See Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2006), affd,
Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 274 Fed. Appx. 489 (7th Cir. 2008).
24 Congress did not provide that any violation gives rise to statutory damages.
Rather, the violation must have been "willful," which has been defined as including a
reckless disregard for the statutory duty. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S.
47, 71 (2007). Therefore, a business would not be subject to statutory damages for a
mere negligent violation of the provision.
247 LeCours, supra note 28, at 350.
248 Id. at 351.
249 Id. at 343.
250 Murray, 434 F.3d at 954. See also LeCours, supra note 28, at 335 (explaining
that while the Supreme Court has provided that punitive damages warrant
heightened judicial review to assess whether the award is so excessive as to violate
due process, the same standard cannot be applied in a review of statutory damages,
as a heightened review would constitute an "impermissible invasion into the domain
of the legislature").
21 LeCours, supra note 28, at 343.
252 Id. at 345-46.
253 Id. at 343.
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wrongful conduct but also "vindicate the statutory policy."2 54 The
types of "injuries" that are well suited for statutory damages,
namely those that are small yet numerous and identical, are
often times also well suited for class actions.2 55 Class actions
themselves add marketability to trivial claims, thereby further
encouraging litigation.25 6 Together, statutory damages and class
actions combine to uncover wrongdoing that would otherwise go
undetected, thereby creating a deterrent effect and an effective
enforcement mechanism for the statute.257
Congress had good reason to provide the remedy it did for a
violation of FACTA's truncation provision. Consistent with its
overall purpose of preventing identity theft, FACTA's truncation
provision can be violated absent a showing of actual harm to the
consumer. Therefore, absent the availability of statutory
damages for a violation of the provision, it would not be
worthwhile for consumers to vindicate their interests through
litigation. Without litigation or the threat thereof as an
enforcement mechanism, merchants would be more likely to
continue to expose consumers to the risk of identity theft
presented by an improperly truncated receipt, in frustration of
the statute's explicit purpose. Moreover, the subsequent reliance
on class actions by plaintiffs in these suits was likely considered
by Congress.2 58  Given the important policy interest behind
FACTA, "a forceful regulatory scheme" is appropriate and
cc 1"259
necessary to assure compliance.
However, as some commentators have noted, the current
state of the statutory damages provision, allowing for unlimited
damages in large class action lawsuits, creates the potential for
over-deterrence.26 0 While the public policy interest FACTA seeks
to vindicate requires a "forceful regulatory scheme" in order to
assure compliance, the astronomical damages frequently sought
in class actions brought under the truncation provision often
exceed any reasonable level necessary to compel compliance.2 61
21 Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory
Damages and Class Actions, 74 Mo. L. REV. 103, 111 (2009).
255 LeCours, supra note 28, at 343.
256 Scheuerman, supra note 254, at 109.
257 Id.
2'8 LeCours, supra note 28, at 344.
259 Id.
260 See Scheuerman, supra note 254, at 108.
261 Id. at 111.
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For example, in one action brought under the provision, a class of
2.9 million people meant the potential liability of the defendant
could be up to 2.9 billion dollars.2 62 While some in the field have
argued that Congress was aware of the potential for aggregation
of statutory damage claims in a class action suit when it enacted
FATCA,2 63 it seems implausible that Congress anticipated the
catastrophic penalties businesses are facing for technical
violations of a statutory provision that do not involve actual
harm.264
Congress faced a very similar situation in the years following
the enactment of a different statute with a very similar statutory
damages provision.2 65 When Congress enacted the Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA") in 1968, it provided for statutory damages
of $100 to $1,000 for failure to comply with the statute's
disclosure requirements.2 66 The provision was intended "to make
it worthwhile for an individual to bring an enforcement action
even if actual damages amounted to only a few dollars."267
However, courts and commentators began to highlight the
"potentially devastating" nature of these damages when
aggregated through class actions.2 68  In response, Congress
amended TILA's statutory damage provision in 1974 to limit the
maximum class action liability for a violation of the disclosure
requirement.26 9 Congress noted that the purpose of the statutory
damages provision, namely to compel compliance "without
relying upon an extensive new bureaucracy," could be achieved
"without subjecting creditors to enormous penalties for violations
which do not involve actual damages and may be of a technical
nature."2 7 0 Therefore, in limiting aggregated statutory damages,
Congress was "protect[ing] small business firms from
262 See, Lopez v. KB Toys Retail, Inc., No. CV 07-144-JFW (CWx), 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 82025, at *14 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2007).
263 LeCours, supra note 28, at 344.
264 See Scheuerman, supra note 254, at 145.
265 See id. at 143-46.
266 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
267 Scheuerman, supra note 254, at 110.
268 See id. at 143-44.
269 Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(A), 88 Stat. 1500, 1518.
Congress originally set the cap at the lesser of $100,000 or 1% of the net worth of the
creditor. Id. However, in 1976, Congress raised the maximum dollar amount to
$500,000. Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4(3), 90 Stat. 257,
260 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
270 Scheuerman, supra note 254, at 145.
1046 [Vol. 86:1011
FACTA AND ONLINE TRANSACTIONS
catastrophic judgments," while nonetheless maintaining the
enforcement mechanisms of statutory damages and class
actions.2 71
The concerns surrounding FACTA's statutory damage
provision are analogous to those that influenced Congress to
place a cap on aggregated statutory damages under TILA. Under
both statutes, the statutory damages provisions were intended to
make individual claims marketable and thereby serve as an
incentive for businesses to comply with the law.27 2 Moreover, like
the original provision in TILA, FACTA currently allows statutory
damages ranging from $100 to $1,000 for each violation of the
statute's truncation provision and does not limit the amount of
aggregated statutory damages available in a class action
situation.2 73 In addition, just as criticism of the damages
provision's application in class action suits began in the wake of
TILA's enactment, shortly after FACTA was enacted in 2003,
courts and commentators began to criticize its statutory damages
provision as applied to class action suits, noting the debilitating
awards resulting from aggregated statutory damages in such
situations. 274 Therefore, given the similar concerns of crippling
effects on business surrounding FACTA's statutory provisions to
those concerns that compelled Congress to place a cap on class
action liability in TILA, Congress should enact an analogous
solution under FACTA. Limiting the maximum amount of
aggregated statutory damages available in class action suits
brought under FACTA's truncation provision would continue to
make use of statutory damages and class actions as enforcement
mechanisms, thereby compelling compliance and vindicating the
statutory policy of preventing identity theft, just as the limit did
under TILA. Furthermore, just as under TILA, imposing such a
cap would accomplish such compliance without subjecting
merchants to astronomical penalties for violations that are
technical in nature and allege little to no actual harm.
21 Id. at 145-46.
272 Id. at 110 (discussing TILA); LeCours, supra note 28, at 344 (discussing
FACTA).
273 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(ii).
274 Lopez v. KB Toys Retail, Inc., No. CV 07-144-JFW (CWx), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82025, at *14 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2007) ("[An award of even the minimum
statutory damages would put [d]efendant out of business.").
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Therefore, Congress should not do away with the statutory
damages provision altogether. However, Congress should take
steps to avoid the potentially crippling effects of the statutory
damages provision on businesses. This concern seems especially
poignant given the changing habits of consumers and the
resulting expanded customer bases of online merchants, as this
leads to larger pools of potential class action plaintiffs. This Note
proposes that Congress amend the statutory damage provision so
as to limit the maximum liability in a class action suit, as it did
when similar concerns arose under TILA. Consistent with policy
considerations, while a violation of the statute would still subject
merchants to significant liability,"' it would no longer be
debilitating for businesses.
CONCLUSION
"All's well that ends well." - William Shakespeare2 76
When Congress enacted FACTA, it made sure that its
purpose was clear. Explicitly including its goal of preventing
identity theft within the statute itself, Congress likely did not
anticipate any subversion of its intent. However, interpreting
FACTA's truncation provision as inapplicable to online
transactions would frustrate the statute's purpose, leaving
consumers at risk of falling victim to identity theft. Moreover,
such a reading cannot be reconciled with the statute's language,
nor with public policy concerns. On the other hand, interpreting
the truncation provision as applicable to online transactions
makes it consistent with Congress's goal of preventing identity
theft. Requiring merchants to truncate a consumer's credit or
debit card information on e-receipts would help prevent identity
theft by removing one more avenue potential fraudsters have to
obtain a consumer's sensitive information.
Moreover, while the availability of statutory damages for a
willful violation of the truncation provision is appropriate given
the important public policy interests underlying the provision,
the debilitating effect that limitless per violation statutory
damages have had on businesses in large class actions could not
275 For instance, if Congress adopts the same cap they did under TILA, a
merchant's liability would be the lesser of $1,000,000 or 1% of the merchant's net
worth.
276 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL act 4, sc. 4.
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have been intended or anticipated by Congress. Therefore,
Congress should revisit the damages provision so as to help
prevent such unreasonable imposition on business for technical
violations of the statute. Specifically, Congress should amend
the damages provisions to limit the maximum liability in cases
where statutory damages are aggregated in class actions.
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